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Accountable Care Organizations: Back to the Future?
Abstract
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are networks of providers that assume risk for the quality and total
cost of the care they deliver. Public policymakers and private insurers hope that ACOs will achieve the elusive
“triple aim” of improving quality of care, improving population health, and reducing costs. The model is still
evolving, but the premise is that ACOs will accomplish these aims by coordinating care, managing chronic
disease, and aligning financial incentives for hospitals and physicians. If this sounds familiar, it may be because
the integrated care networks of the 1990s tried some of the same things, and mostly failed in their attempts.
This Issue Brief summarizes the similarities and differences between the new ACOs and the integrated
delivery networks of the 1990s, and presents the authors’ analysis of the likely success of these new
organizations in affecting the costs and quality of health care.
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Accountable Care Organizations: 
Back to the Future?
Editor’s note: Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are networks of providers 
that assume risk for the quality and total cost of the care they deliver. Public 
policymakers and private insurers hope that ACOs will achieve the elusive “triple 
aim” of improving quality of care, improving population health, and reducing 
costs. The model is still evolving, but the premise is that ACOs will accomplish 
these aims by coordinating care, managing chronic disease, and aligning financial 
incentives for hospitals and physicians. If this sounds familiar, it may be because 
the integrated care networks of the 1990s tried some of the same things, and 
mostly failed in their attempts. This Issue Brief summarizes the similarities and 
differences between the new ACOs and the integrated delivery networks of 
the 1990s, and presents the authors’ analysis of the likely success of these new 
organizations in affecting the costs and quality of health care. 
The move toward ACOs comes from the need to contain costs in the Medicare 
program. The Affordable Care Act authorized Medicare to contract with ACOs, 
which will assume risk for the quality and costs of care they deliver. As envisioned 
by its proponents, ACOs will save money because they will reorganize care to 
be more effective and efficient. Each ACO must care for at least 5,000 Medicare 
recipients for at least three years, and agree to meet certain quality standards and 
cost targets. If an ACO saves money, it shares in the savings; if it puts itself at risk 
for losing money, it can gain a larger share of the savings.
•	 Two	assumptions	underlie	the	promise	of	ACOs:	that	better	care	coordination	
will improve quality at any given cost, and that ACOs will slow the rate of 
growth in Medicare spending. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) estimates that ACOs will save the federal government $940 million over 
four years, if 270 organizations participate in the program.
•	 To	date,	CMS	has	awarded	contracts	to	153	ACOs.	The	majority	of	them	are	
led by hospital systems, although some are spearheaded by physician groups. 
The number of contracts is expected to double after another round of awards in 
January	2013.
•	 In	theory,	ACOs	will	improve	quality	and	lower	costs	using	several	methods,	
including disease management programs, improved care coordination, 
alignment of incentives for physicians and hospitals via shared savings, use of 
nonphysician providers, and the formation of patient-centered medical homes. 
Affordable Care Act spurs 
development of ACOs
This latest attempt at reorganizing care strongly resembles the integrated delivery 
networks (IDNs) of the 1990s, which linked physicians, hospitals, and alternative 
care	sites.	Hospitals	created	joint	ventures	with	their	medical	staffs	and	formed	
physician-hospital organizations and management services organizations to 
negotiate contracts with insurers. 
•	 Both	models	emphasize	coordination	of	care	and	disease	management.	Both	
focus on primary care providers as the key to improving quality, managing risk, 
and controlling costs.
•	 Structurally,	both	models	encourage	horizontal	consolidation	of	hospitals	
and vertical (or virtual) integration of hospitals, physicians, and providers of 
postacute care.
•	 Payment	systems	in	both	models	seek	to	escape	the	volume	incentives	of	fee-for-
service by relying on risk contracting, capitation, and employed physicians.
ACOs resemble integrated 
delivery networks of the 
1990s in some ways
However,	ACOs	are	not	just	another	name	for	the	integrated	networks	of	the	
1990s. There is less consensus now on what should be the ACO’s organizational 
core—a hospital system, physician group practice, or some wholly new type 
of organization—and over what the new entity should do, or stop doing, to 
reduce spending. 
•	 In	contrast	to	the	earlier	networks,	the	impetus	for	ACOs	comes	from	the	
demand side (CMS) rather the supply side (providers). CMS is patron and 
protector of the current restructuring effort, seeking to bring down costs to 
help alleviate the federal deficit.
•	 In	the	1990s,	there	was	some	agreement	that	capitated	contracts	between	
insurers and IDNs would cut costs by reducing hospital admissions and 
inpatient days, and by restricting out-of-network utilization. In contrast, 
Medicare ACOs cannot directly control patients’ choice of physician or health 
care utilization. 
•	 More	than	20	years	later,	ACOs	may	benefit	from	more	advanced	information	
technology and more sophisticated payment systems than the IDNs. ACOs are 
developing alternative payment systems beyond capitated arrangements, such as 
bundled payments and shared savings through pay-for-performance 
for providers.
ACOs differ from integrated 
networks in other ways
What the network experience 
tells us about ACOs
For the most part, IDNs did not deliver on their promises. They lacked the 
information technology needed to manage risk contracts; they overpaid for 
physician practices; they acquired hospitals without achieving economies of scale; 
and they failed to coordinate care for most beneficiaries. What might the ACOs 
learn from this experience to avoid the same fate? 
•	 Although	they	were	labeled	integrated	and	networks,	most	of	the	earlier	
organizations did not have unified governance and did not take a systems 
approach to organizational planning. ACOs will need to pay more attention to 
integrating everything from personnel matters to physician culture. 
•	 Coordination	among	multiple	providers	is	harder	than	it	sounds.	And	it	poses	
daunting challenges, as Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries see an average of 
two primary care providers and five specialists across four sites of care annually.
Continued on back.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS The parallels between the ACOs and the IDNs seem quite strong, raising concerns 
that the newer entities will have the same fate as the earlier networks. In the 1990s, 
the ability of IDNs to achieve economies of scale and a seamless continuum of 
care	was	oversold.	Today,	policymakers	need	to	realistically	assess	and	periodically	
revisit the promises and premises of ACOs. 
•	 Just	like	the	1990s	networks,	ACOs	need	to	target	specific	population	segments	
that would benefit most from coordinated care, such as people with multiple 
chronic conditions. Coordination will not likely reduce total expenditures for 
the broader low-risk Medicare population.
•	 Evaluations	of	disease	management	programs	for	patients	with	chronic	illness	
have shown that some programs may improve patients’ functional status but do 
not save money. The Congressional Budget Office found insufficient evidence 
that disease management programs can even pay for themselves.
•	 ACOs	are	designed	to	work	in	tandem	with	a	patient-centered	medical	home,	
in which a team led by a primary care physician provides comprehensive 
services.	Demonstration	projects	suggest	that	any	improvements	in	quality	
and costs rest on long-term practice transformation, an internal capacity for 
organizational learning, physicians’ willingness to collaborate and function as 
part of a team, and a multiyear commitment to change. Implementing all of 
these changes will take considerable time and money.
•	 Perhaps	no	single	element	of	ACOs	has	received	as	much	attention	and	funding	
as information technology. However, research on decision support systems, 
computerized physician order entry and electronic health records reveal mixed 
effects on costs and quality. Overall, it suggests that information technology is 
necessary but insufficient to improve outcomes.
ACOs face inherent challenges in meeting their goals. Their success may be 
limited by existing shortages in the primary care workforce, the dearth of large 
multispecialty physician groups, and the absence of direct controls on out-of-
network utilization by Medicare beneficiaries. 
•	 ACOs	rest	on	a	foundation	of	primary	care	physicians	who	can	coordinate	all	
medical care for high-risk patients in addition to supplying their own services. 
However, there is a shortage and uneven geographic distribution of primary care 
physicians nationwide. It is unclear how large a role nonphysician providers will 
play in meeting the increased demands of the patient-centered medical home, 
and whether these providers can lower cost. 
•	 Larger	physician	groups	deliver	care	that	is	higher	quality	and	more	efficient.	
These groups may be in the best position to house the patient-centered medical 
home, but the number of groups has remained stagnant for decades. The spread 
of large multispecialty groups has been limited to certain states and regions, 
such as California. Quick change is unlikely.
•	 Primary	care	providers	must	curb	utilization	for	Medicare	patients,	because	
the ACO is at financial risk. But unlike the earlier networks, the primary care 
provider is not an explicit gatekeeper and cannot directly control patient use of 
out-of-network providers and specialists. Instead, they must rely on persuading 
patients to avoid self-referrals to specialists. 
The Achilles’ heels of ACOs: 
primary care workforce, 
physician practice 
organization, and 
out-of-network utilization
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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•	 Strategic	change	needs	to	be	carefully	implemented.	Providers	may	need	
to pay more attention to change management and devote considerable 
time and money to infrastructure features and capabilities. Although CMS 
wants organizations to assume greater risk within three years, research on 
organizational change suggests a more realistic window is five to seven years.
•	 Medicare’s	need	to	slow	growth	of	its	payments	may	move	it	toward	providing	
a budget-based capitation payment. It may be that Medicare will give a set 
amount to ACOs, and ACOs will do the best they can with that amount. If 
that happens, it will be a true test of how much waste there is in the system.
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